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Abstract 
This paper incorporates a new inter-disciplinary methodology of the New Institutional 
and Transaction Costs Economics, and examines pace, factors and modes for post-communist 
agricultural specialization and farming structures development in Bulgaria. Firstly, it presents 
the specific Bulgarian model for farming transformation characterizing with restitution of 
farmland in real borders and original locations, physical distribution of assets of ancient 
public farms into individual shares, rapid liberalization of markets and prices, and lack of 
public support to agriculture. Secondly, it specify factors for evolution of new farm structures 
and specialization such as badly specified and enforced property rights; big institutional, 
market and behavioral uncertainty; high assets specificity and dependency; lack of managerial 
experience; low incentives for long-term investment; ineffective public interventions etc. 
Next, it demonstrates how these factors affect organization and specialization of farming in 
the country explaining the evolution of a huge subsistence and part-time farming, production 
cooperation at a large scale, unprecedented concentration of resources in few business farms, 
widespread use of informal and integrated modes etc. Forth, it analyzes the impact of 
transition on farm structures and agricultural specialization through changes in structure and 
share of agricultural GDP and employment, and distribution of activities between different 
types of farms. Finally, it clarifies efficiency of and extend of specialization in dominating 
large business farms, production cooperatives, and numerous small-scale unregistered farms. 
 
Key words: agricultural specialization, farm governance, transaction costs, comparative 
institutional analysis, Bulgarian agriculture 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Since the collapse of Communist system in 1989 Bulgarian agriculture has gone through 
an unprecedented transformation from a centrally planed to a market based private economy. 
The fundamental transition has affected significantly agricultural specialization and farming 
structures (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001; Bencheva, 2005; OECD, 2000). The unique post-
communist ‘Bulgarian experience’ gives an extraordinary opportunity to study evolution and 
factors of agricultural specialization. However, there are no comprehensive studies on 
agricultural specialization during that most recent period of development.  
The goal of this paper is to fill the gap and examine modes and factors of post-
communist agricultural specialization and farming structures development in Bulgaria. We 
incorporate an inter-disciplinary methodology of the New Institutional and Transaction Costs 
Economics based on contributions of Coase (1937), Furuboth and Richter (1998), North 
(2000), and Williamson (1996). Firstly, we outline the framework for analysis of economic 
specialization in transitional agriculture. Next, we present features of Bulgarian model of 
farming transformation, specifying factors for development of farming structures and 
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specialization, and impacts on agricultural specialization. Finally, we analyze specific 
governance and specialization in dominating business farms, cooperatives, and unregistered 
farms. The study is based on official (statistical, census etc.) as well as original data collected 
from managers of ‘typical’ farms in all major regions. The survey was carried out in 2003 
during the last Agricultural Census and covers 194 farms of different types (0,5 percent of the 
commercial farms in the country). Thirty eight percent of surveyed farms are unregistered 
‘individual, family, or group farms’, almost twenty nine percent are ‘cooperatives’, and one-
third has a status of ‘firm’.  
 
II. New Institutional Economics framework 
 
The New Institutional Economics let us better understand ‘logic’ and driving factors of 
agricultural specialization and farming structures development (Bachev, 2004; Masten, 1991; 
Sporleder, 1992).  
A potential to increase productivity gives incentives for division and specialization of 
labor2. In agricultural production specialization could be on a particular product(s) (crop, 
livestock, fruits, cereals, milk, meat-cattle, organic honey) or a specific function(s) 
(management, mechanization, plant protection, harvesting, guarding, risk taking, marketing). 
Specialization of labor inevitably requires coordination of specialized activity and exchange 
(of products, resources, rights) between individual agents. The governance (coordination, 
stimulation) of specialization and exchanges of individuals could be done by free market 
(price-movements, private negotiations), whiting a private organization (by a manager, 
collective decision-making), and/or by a third party (e.g. state authority).  
If transaction costs were zero3 then all modes of governance (market, contract, family 
farm, partnership, cooperative, nationwide hierarchy) would have equal efficiency.  Then the 
type and extend of specialization would depend only on technological factors - potential to 
economize on production costs, explore economies of scale/scope, increase productivity, and 
profit from mutually beneficial exchange. However, when transaction costs are positive then 
the ‘governance matters’ and have a significant impact on evolution of agricultural 
specialization and exchange. For instance, when a farmer integrates ‘mechanization service’ 
(buying a tractor and hiring a tractorist) instead of supplying it from market, the economic 
benefits are not (only) technological (savings on production costs). The internal mode for 
governing of activity (specialization) often has substantial transaction costs advantages – 
economizing costs for finding best prices and suppliers, and for negotiating conditions of 
exchange; diminishing market uncertainty and risk from outside dependency etc.  
There are a great range of specializations of agricultural activities within internal 
organizations and/or across markets. In one extreme, a high level of outside transaction costs 
could restrict development of specialization in small-scale subsistence farming or caused 
multi-product integration into large member-oriented cooperatives. In another extreme, a 
specialized (in management) farm entrepreneur could carry out the entire production activity 
purchasing all related services (tilling, watering, fertilizing, plant protection, harvesting) from 
specialized markets4. Which mode for governing of a particular type of activity will dominate 
depends on comparative efficiency (advantages, disadvantages) of alternative forms.  
The ‘rational’ agrarian agent would tend to choose the most efficient mode(s) for 
governing relations with others – that one which allow achieving maximum productivity 
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(benefits) while minimizing total production and transaction costs 5 . According to the 
individual’s personal characteristics (skills, ability) and the specific institutional, market and 
natural environment there will be different efficient forms for governing of farming activity. 
For instance, in transitional economies property rights were not well defined and enforced, 
individuals had little managerial experience and face significant institutional, market, and 
behavioral uncertainty. In these conditions subsistence (semi-market) household holdings and 
large integrated cooperatives and agri-firms happened to me the most effective forms of 
farming organization (Bachev, 2004: 140). In the former case, the high transaction costs 
restricted agricultural specialization and farm size far bellow the technological opportunities 
(potential for growth in productivity). In the later case, the huge potential for transacting 
benefits extended enormously internal specialization and (horizontal and vertical) borders of 
farms beyond technological determinants. 
Following this new framework farm is to be studied as a governance structure with 
consumption, production, and transaction optimization functions (Bachev, 2004: 139). 
Furthermore, in order to explain evolution of diverse modes of specialization and distribution 
of activities between different farming organizations we have to analyze structure of agrarian 
transactions and associated transacting costs. Since much of the transaction costs are hardly 
to quantify the analysis is to concentrate on their ‘critical factors’ – institutional (structure of 
formal and informal property rights and system of their enforcement), behavioral (agents 
bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion, reputation consideration), 
dimensional (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of transactions), 
and technological.  
Next, in order to assess the extend of specialization of different farms we have to 
examine modes for governing of labor supply, service supply, inputs supply, land supply, 
finance supply, and marketing of output. For instance, intensified outside trade (inputs and 
service supply, marketing of farm produce) is an indicator for increased market specialization 
while on farm organization of additional labor (own production of inputs and ‘services’, 
internal utilization of outputs) is a sign for deepen internal specialization. What is more, ‘full’ 
efficiency of individual forms could be only understood in the context of governance of the 
entire farm. For example, effective extension of livestock farm could be done though new 
‘specialization’ (e.g. production of forage for own animals though leasing in farmland and 
hiring crop labor) rather than pure enlargement of ‘specialized’ livestock operations (buying 
more forage from market, hiring additional livestock workers, selling more livestock 
products). 
Finally, for evaluation of proper efficiency of diverse forms for agrarian organization 
the analysis is to embrace their comparative efficiency and complementarities as well as the 
larger household and rural economy. For instance, low productive multi-product cooperatives 
proved to be an effective form for governing of specialization and exchange in transitional 
countries with widespread small-scale and subsistence farming (Bachev, 2004: 141). On the 
other hand, a ‘less’ effective form of agricultural specialization such as part-time farming 
turned to be an essential part of households specialization (economy) in transitional 
conditions of high unemployment, great insecurity, and significant food costs.  
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III. Bulgarian model for farming transformation 
 
During the Communist period (1944-1989) Bulgarian farming was carried out in large 
public farms averaging thousands hectares and up to 6000 employees. Private ownership on 
major agrarian resources and market exchanges were abandoned. Public farms were 
responsible for food supply of local communities producing a broad range of farm and 
processed products. There were high functional and subject specialization of farms divisions 
and labor. Most activities (specialization and exchange) were governed by a Central Plan 
through an overcrowded multilevel hierarchical organization (reaching up to thirty percent of 
agricultural employment). There were many reorganizations (Table 1) and experimentations 
with ‘economic mechanisms’ aiming at improving efficiency. Nevertheless, up to the 
collapse the socialist model the deficiency in incentives and productivity prevailed while 
most farms resources and production structure rested under state control.  Since 1970s small 
‘private’ farms were allowed mostly for food self-supply of households. Despite small size 
these ‘personal plots’ provided a major part of certain produce - maize, potatoes, eggs, meat, 
honey, tobacco, fruits and vegetable (National Statistical Institute).  
 
Table 1: Development of farming structures in Bulgaria 
Type of farms  Communist period Transition  
 1944 1958 1969 1977 1985 1989 1995 2000 2005 
 Private farms (000) 1100 330 - na 1600 1600 1772 755.3 515.3 
 Average size (ha) 3.9 2.6 -  0.4 0.4 1.3 0.9 1.8 
 Cooperatives 110 3200 795 - - - 2623 3125 1525 
 Average size (ha) 241 1264 4140      800 709.9 584 
 State farms - 49 159 - - - 1002 232 - 
 Average size (ha)   3426 4040 -    338 358  
 Agro-industrial complexes - - - 143 298 - - - - 
 Average size (ha)       32833 12600         
 Collective farms - - -  - 2101 - - - 
 Average size (ha)       2423    
 Agro-firms - - -  - - n.a. 2200 3704 
 Average size (ha)            n.a. 300 249.4 
Source: National Statistical Institute                                     
 
Following 1991 reform all forcefully ‘cooperated’ or nationalized farmland was 
restituted to previous owners. Complex land transformation was implemented which took 
almost ten years to complete affecting eighty five percent of agricultural land and turning a 
three-quarter of households into owners of farmland. Ancient cooperatives and other 
organizations established on their bases were liquidated and their assets distributed into 
individual shares. Liquidation took more than four years and made more than two million 
Bulgarians owners of small stakes in assets of ancient public farms.  
Fundamental transformation of the economy was also carried out liberalizing markets, 
privatizing public enterprises, introducing EU institutions and standards. Economic reforms 
released market competition and introduced strong incentives for private entrepreneurship. 
More than 1,9 million private farms emerged on provisional or entirely restored private rights 
of lands and agrarian assets. By 1995 almost all agricultural activities (and specialization) 
were governed by entirely new market and private structures. Previous model of agricultural 
specialization within large public farms and a nationwide hierarchy was replaced by a 
capitalistic system of private entrepreneurship (private order) and free market mechanisms.  
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IV. Factors for development of farming structures and specialization  
 
Specific type and pace of privatization of agrarian resources and big transitional 
uncertainty had important consequences for the development of farming organization in the 
country.  
Firstly, prolonged lack of full ownership on agrarian resources restricted feasible forms 
for their effective organization. Sells and long-term lease markets for farmland did not emerge 
until 2000 and annual lease was a major way for farm extension. Agrarian agents were unable 
to get full return on proprietary rights or use land ownership for setting up sustainable 
coalition and organization of other transactions (e.g. collateral against credit). On the other 
hand, unspecified or ideal character of ownership let rapid consolidation of fragmented 
farmland under management of small number of huge market oriented enterprises (Table 2). 
Thus governance of significant share of agrarian activities and specialization has been done 
within integral organizations rather than market competition. 
 
Table 2:  Share of different farms in total holdings and major resources in Bulgaria 
Indicators Physical 
persons 
Coope-
ratives
Sole 
traders 
Com-
panies 
Associ-
ations 
Number of holdings with farmland (%) 99.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.05 
Share in Utilized agricultural area (%) 30.3 40.3 11.7 16.1 1.6 
Average size (ha) 1.4 592.6 118.8 352.5 126.2 
Number of breeders without land (%) 96.1 0.2 1.9 1.7 0.1 
Share in workforce (%) 95.5 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.3 
Share in labor input (%) 91.1 4.1 1.4 2.8 0.6 
Source: MAF, 2005 
Secondly, internal organization of available household resources in own individual or 
family farm was an effective way to overcome a great institutional and economic uncertainty 
and minimize transacting costs. During much of the transition market and contract trade of 
household’s capital was either impossible or very expensive - missing markets situation, high 
uncertainty and risk, asymmetry of information, big possibility for opportunism in time of 
hardship. Many lost their jobs as result of restructuring of public companies. Low payoff of 
outside trade was combined with an increased share of households’ food costs. Internal 
organization turned to be most effective way to protect and get return on resources, and secure 
stable income for households. A long-term tradition with ‘personal plots’ from the 
Communist period, and insignificant costs for acquiring specialized knowledge made 
development costs for own farm accessible for everybody regardless previous occupation. 
Own production has been effective mode to guarantee cheep, stable and high quality delivery 
of food, provide employment for family members, or be favorable free-time occupation.  
That is how a huge subsistent and part-time farming emerged affecting a considerable 
part of households. Miniature (full time) specialization of unemployed/retired persons or 
(part-time) diversification into farming of engages in other businesses took place. Even now 
full-time employed in the sector accounts for eleven and a half percent of all workers in the 
country (National Statistical Institute, 2005). In addition, almost one million Bulgarians are 
involved in farming on a part-time base as ‘supplementary’ income source. Estimates in 
Annual Work Units (AWU) show that agriculture comprises more than 26 percent of the 
overall employment (MAF, 2006). Labor contributed by part-time workers reaches fifty tree 
percent of AWU of the sector.  
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Now more than three-quarters of farms are less than one ha, averaging a half ha. More 
than ninety seven percent of livestock holdings are unprofessional farms having few heads but 
breading ninety six percent of goats, eighty six percent of sheep, seventy eight percent of 
cattle, and sixty percent of pigs. More than ninety percent of farms are less that two European 
Size Units6, and generally considered as subsistent and semi-subsistence farms. In livestock 
grazing and mix orientation later bring considerable share of Standard Gross Margin in 
respective groups (MAF, 2005). 
Within small farms no labor specialization is practiced or it is carried out between few 
family members. Most farms are not specialized for market rather aim at serving diversified 
food needs of households producing a great range of crop and livestock products. For 
vegetables, fruits, vine and livestock a significant portion of the overall national output is for 
own consumption (MAF, 2005). A great fraction of farms sells out only surpluses for major 
commodity products (Figure 1). For Physical Persons the number is higher as less than thirty 
nine percent of farms report they sell products and for more than fifty percent those are 
surpluses not consumed by households (MAF, 2005). 
 
Figure 1: Share of farms marketing products in Bulgaria 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Milk Eggs Vegetables Potatous Fruits Grapes
Pe
rc
en
t
Selling
only
surplus
Regular
sells
Source:  MAF,  2005 
 
Third, most agrarian agents found their skills (previous specialization, team working 
tradition) and portions in acquired agrarian resources in a high interdependency. A great part 
of individuals’ shares in ancient public farms were in indivisible assets - large machinery, 
buildings, irrigation facilities. For later there were no any alternative but liquidate (through 
sales, consumption) or keep them up as a joint (cooperative) ownership. In many cases, ‘new’ 
land owners got restituted their plots with fruit trees, vineyards etc., and they could practically 
execute much of activities in a cooperation. Most land and share-holders happened to live 
away from rural areas, or have other business, or be old of age, or have no skills or capital to 
start own farms. In absence of big demand for farmland and confidence in emerging new 
private modes, the only option was to joint a cooperative. That is how more than 40 percent of 
new owners pulled their free land, assets, and labor in new production cooperatives. 
Similarly, most privatized state farming and livestock companies were taken-over by 
‘managerial-workers’ teams and registered as Shareholder Companies and Associations 
keeping previous (internal and market) specialization. 
                                                 
6 One European Size Unit = 1200 Euro. 
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Forth, there was no or little experience in managing private or collective farms in 
majority of new entrepreneurs. Moreover, there has been lack of public support in farming 
training, advisory service and funding (Bachev, 2006: 143). That has been coupled with a 
strong competition with heavily subsidized foreign producers at local and international 
markets alike. As result there has been massive failures, take-overs and ceasing commercial 
activities of a good number of newly evolving farms. Comparing to 1994 pick the amount of 
farms decreased with seventy two percent in 2005. Therefore, considerable portion of agrarian 
activity and resources has gone through several governance structures or got out of productive 
uses.  That little sustainability of farming structures has got significant implications for the 
extension of agricultural specialization. 
Fifth, there have been low incentives for a long-term investment in specialized and 
specific capital in most farms (Figure 2). That has deterred development of specialization both 
within farms and across markets. For long time significant portion of agrarian resources were 
governed by ineffective “temporary” structures (Privatization Boards, Liquidation Councils 
etc.) with no interest in long-term productivity. In conditions of high instability and 
uncertainty the sustainability and investment activity of commercial enterprises is low 
(Bachev, 2006:137). Moreover, much of farming related investment are highly specific and 
can hardly be funded by outside credit or equity sells (Bachev, 2006: 137). Majority of small-
scale commercial farms are run by older generation entrepreneurs with a short business 
(investment) perspective7. Almost all farmland of large business farms has been supplied by 
provisional lease-in contracts. While there have been strong investments in mobile material 
assets there has been no long-term investment for improving land productivity (renovation of 
orchard, vineyard, irrigation facilities; compensating N, P and K intakes). Most cooperatives 
has been mismanaged or experienced significant funding problems because of different 
investment preferences of members (Bachev, 2006: 142). As far as subsistence farming is 
concerned it does not necessitate significant investment since households demand is stable.   
 
V. Impact of farming transformation on agricultural specialization 
 
Post-communist transformation of agriculture has increased farming importance in 
national economy both in terms of contribution to the Gross Domestic Product and 
employment (Figure 2). Comparing to 1989 agricultural employment increased by twenty 
percent as its share in overall employment doubled. Therefore, overall agricultural 
specialization expanded as more people find work and income in this sector of national 
economy. On the other hand, seventy five percent of employed in farming are engaged on 
part-time bases indicating domination of primitive (rather that complete) forms of agricultural 
specialization (less specialization of labor, less exchanges).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Managers older than forty five and sixty five are eighty five percent and forty percent accordingly 
(MAF,  2005).                                    . 
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Figure 2: Share of Bulgarian agriculture in national economy  
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Source: National Statistical Institute                                     
 
Post-communist market adjustment and farm adaptation has been associated with 
alteration of production structure and a general decline in agricultural output (Figure 3). There 
has been a significant change in general product specialization and importance of different 
sub-sectors (Figure 4). Livestock lost its dominant pre-reform share melting down to twenty 
six percent of the Gross Agricultural Product (GAP). While poultry maintains its segment, 
cattle, sheep and goat, and pigs portions dropped considerably. At the same time, vegetables 
have seen its share significantly augmented expanding from the sixth to the largest contributor 
to GAP. Cereals and industrial crops also extended being the second and the third most 
important productions. 
 
 
Figure 3: Dynamics of major agricultural productions (1989=100) 
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        Source: National Statistical Institute                                     
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Figure 4: Composition of Gross Agricultural Product in Bulgaria 
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Figure 5:  Share of farms with different specialization and contribution to 
Standard Gross Margin of agriculture  
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Newly evolving farming structure is characterized with entirely different type of 
specialization comparing to the pre-reform period. A sizable share of farms produces large 
number of different products. Only in cereals, oil plants, aromatic and medicinal crops 
production is more specialized. A fraction of specialized livestock farms (big operators) is 
insignificant. While different ‘mix farms’ and primitive ‘grazing animal farms’ comprise a 
bulk of the farms, specialized farms of various kinds produce the greatest part of Standard 
Gross Margin (SGM) of the sector (Figure 5). Larger commercial farms (bigger than two 
ESU) with different type of specialization contribute most to SGM in all groups of 
specialization. A tiny number of all farms in permanent crops (zero point three percent), field 
crops (one point six percent), pigs and poultry (zero point two percent), horticulture (zero 
point forth percent), and mix cropping (zero point twenty five percent) are bigger than 
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hundred ESU but they produce a significant share of SGM in these groups – sixty three 
percent, fifty four percent, fifty four percent, twenty six percent, and twenty eight percent 
accordingly (MAF, 2005). 
 
VI. Governing and specialization of business farms 
 
Our survey has found out that agro-firms are commonly large specialized enterprises. 
Most of these firms were set up as family/partnership businesses during first years of 
transition by younger generation entrepreneurs. Specific management skills and social status, 
and combination of partnership assets (technological knowledge, business ties, available 
resources) led to a rapid extension of farms through enormous concentration of 
management/ownership of resources, specialization and exploration of economy of 
scale/scope, and modernization of enterprises (Bachev, 2006: 136). Institutional uncertainty, 
unsettled rights on assets, personal relations and ‘quasi’/entirely integrated modes were 
extensively used to overcome transaction difficulties. Number of agro-firms has increased 20 
folds since 1990 and doubled since 2000 as their share in overall resources augmented 
(National Statistical Institute).                                    .  
Business farms are profit-oriented organizations, and farmer(s) have great incentives to 
invest in farm-specific (human, material, intangible) capital because they are sole owners of 
the residual rights (benefits) of farm. Owners are family members or close partners, and 
internal transaction costs for coordination, decision-making, and motivation are not high. 
Organizational style of firm is preferred since it provides opportunity to overcome coalition 
difficulties (joint ventures with outside capital, dispute rights through court); diversify into 
farm related/independent businesses; develop firm-specific intangible capital (advertisement, 
brand names, public confidence) and its extension into a daughter company, trade and transfer 
through generations; overcome existing institutional restrictions (e.g. direct foreign 
investments in farmland and engaging in trade with cereals/vine/dairy); provide explicit rights 
for taking part in particular types transactions (e.g. licensing, privatization deals, public 
programs).    
The large size and reputation make business farms preferable partners in inputs supply 
and marketing deals. Recurrence of transactions with same partners is high which restricts 
information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior, and develops mutual trust and other 
mechanisms for facilitating (lowing costs of) relationships – planning, adjustment and 
payment modes, guarantee schemes, dispute resolution devices. Agro-firms have giant 
negotiating power and effective economic, political etc. mechanisms to enforce contracts. 
They possess a great potential to collect market information, search for best partners, use 
experts and innovation, meet special (collateral) requirements and bear risk and costs of 
failures. They could explore economy of scale/scope on production and management 
(‘package’ arrangement of credits for many projects and interlinking inputs supply with 
know-how supply/crediting/marketing). They are also able to invest considerable relation-
specific capital (information, expertise, reputation, lobbying) for dealing with funding 
institutions, agrarian bureaucracy, and market agents at national or international scale.  
Under conditions of non-working court and contract enforcement systems, all critical 
farm transactions are governed (controlled/protected) through internal modes. Farm-specific 
assets such as critical machinery, vineyards, orchards, animals, processing facilities, and 
adjoining land, are all safeguarded by ownership mode. Low cost standard (one-season, share 
rent) lease-in contracts are widely used to govern land supply from tens/hundreds of 
proprietors.  
‘Critical’ transactions are integrated through extensive labor employment (Figure 6). 
Preference to ‘own making’ (internal specialization and organization of activity) rather then 
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market procurement (buying specialized inputs and services across market) is determined by 
transaction costs economizing reason - the high farm specificity and/or uncertainty associated 
with certain transactions. Besides, core labor (specialists, mechanists) is hired on a permanent 
basis and special forms such as output-based compensation, interlinking (housing, services), 
social disbursements, paid holidays are further used to enhance motivation. Furthermore, in 
large business farms it is typical strong internal division and specialization of labor - both 
functional (management, production, marketing, security) and subject (crop, livestock, 
services). Nevertheless, in farming hired (non-family) labor command high transacting costs 
for directing, supervising, protecting opportunistic behavior, disputing. Therefore large 
business farms are mostly specialized in less labor consuming, highly intensive and 
standardized productions (cereals, sunflower, aromatic and medicinal plants, poultry, and 
pigs) where control of labor is easy or output based compensation could be effectively applied 
(Table 3 and 4).  These farms are also a major provider of mechanization services to other 
farms. 
Figure 6: Governing of labor supply in Bulgarian farms 
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Source: survey data 
 
Table 3: Distribution of crop productions in each type of farms (percent) 
Productions Unregistered Cooperatives Sole traders Companies Associations
 Farms Area Farms Area Farms Area Farms Area Farms Area
Cereals 51,1 59,5 93,0 59,7 54,3 62,3 55,1 61,1 51,1 56,0
Dry pulses 13,0 0,8 5,7 0,6 5,9 0,6 3,6 0,5 5,9 1,1 
Oil crops 5,1 17,8 74,4 28,6 28,9 29,7 41,6 27,0 28,2 26,0
Textile crops 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,2 0,5 0,2 
Aromatic and 
medicinal plants 0,5 1,7 17,6 2,5 4,8 1,9 12,8 4,4 6,7 5,6 
Forage 28,6 7,5 29,6 3,1 21,2 1,2 14,0 1,7 23,4 7,5 
Vegetables 49,2 5,5 8,3 0,2 29,2 0,5 11,9 0,4 21,2 0,4 
Fruits 8,7 2,0 14,7 0,9 11,4 0,3 12,2 0,7 35,2 9,5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: MAF, 2005 
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Table 4: Distribution of livestock productions in each type of farms (percent) 
Productions Total Unregistered Cooperatives Sole traders Companies Associations
Cattle 31,8 32,0 13,1 18,8 11,3 22,8 
Buffalo 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,5 0,7 0,8 
Goats 40,4 40,8 0,5 14,7 2,9 6,5 
Sheep 35,7 36,0 5,0 17,1 6,3 13,7 
Pigs 41,9 42,1 3,6 29,9 15,1 20,4 
Poultry 74,3 74,8 1,2 43,2 13,2 15,3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: MAF, 2005 
Table 5:  Governing of service supply in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Service type  Modes Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms 
Own supply 24 49 65 
Own cooperative 5 7 15 
Technological 
knowledge and 
advises Market supplier 13 10 25 
Own supply 18 85 60 Mechanization 
services Own cooperative 22 0 18 
 Market supplier 15 15 28 
Own supply 40 65 60 
Own cooperative 15 7 12 Spreading chemicals 
and pesticides Market supplier 12 25 28 
Own supply 20 60 40 
Veterinary services Own cooperative 5 0 0 
 Market supplier 40 40 60 
Source: survey data  
Table 6: Governing of inputs supply in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Inputs type  Supplier Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms 
Chemicals Own production 17 0 0 
 Own cooperative 10 5 15 
 Market supplier 55 95 90 
 Buyer of farm output 24 13 33 
Own production 47 53 33 
Own cooperative 3 15 23 
Seeds and 
seedlings 
(crop farms) Market supplier 50 32 45 
 Buyer of farm output 4 41 44 
Own production 55 65 50 
Own cooperative 0 0 35 
Market supplier 45 35 15 
Forage 
(livestock 
farms) 
Buyer of farm output 9 6 53 
Machinery Own production 12 13 0 
 Own cooperative 20 17 46 
 Market supplier 68 70 54 
 Buyer of farm output 15 0 19 
Livestock Own production 37 50 28 
 Own cooperative 21 31 33 
 Market supplier 42 19 39 
 Buyer of farm output 40 17 13 
Source: survey data  
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Principally, own supply (‘making’) rather than outside procurement (‘buying’) is 
common for essential services and inputs (Table 5 and 6) which prevents risk from unilateral 
dependency (opportunism of supplier) or missing market situation. In the case of high asset 
interdependency with downstream partners (product specificity; quality/quantity 
dependency) reciprocal supply of ‘inputs against marketing’ is applied. 
Our survey has found out that funding is secured through an effective combination of 
equity, debt, public and hybrid modes. Standard activities/assets are financed by bank credit 
since it is easy to arrange a loan. Alternatively, farm-specific investments are financed 
through private modes - own sources, ‘personal’ loans and co-investment. Special contract 
modes are used to mitigate funding difficulties (shortage of working capital) or facilitate 
mutually-dependent relations with buyers/suppliers such as delayed payments for inputs 
supply (zero interest, loans in kind), interlinking credit with inputs supply and marketing, 
leasing or accepting outside investment (‘hostage taking’, joint ownership) of long-term 
assets.  Agro-firms are also quite successful in recently introduced public support programs 
(e.g. EU Special Assistance Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development) developing 
good proposals, meeting formal requirements, dealing with complicated paper work, and 
‘arranging’ selection of projects.  
Table 7: Governing of marketing in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Output Modes Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms 
Grain Own cooperative 9 7 9 
 Another farm/firm 50 85 75 
 Processor 25 39 37 
 Retail 6 7 16 
Vegetables Own processing 0 0 15 
 Another farm/firm 24 24 35 
 Wholesale market 6 5 15 
 Processor 38 66 30 
 Retail 12 0 6 
Own processing 15 7 19 Fruits and 
grape Own cooperative 24 7 9 
 Another farm/firm 48 39 32 
 Wholesale market 0 22 22 
 Processor 15 36 25 
 Retail 6 0 0 
Meat Own processing 0 10 15 
 Another farm/firm 65 71 80 
 Processor 29 43 30 
 Retail 15 36 20 
Milk Own processing 0 10 15 
 Another farm/firm 42 43 40 
 Processor 51 64 45 
 Retail 19 0 15 
Source: survey data  
In marketing of farm output and services a classical trade across market (wholesale 
market; business with market agents) dominates (Table 7). Main part of farm’s product has 
standardized (commodity) character and market prices/competition effectively governs 
relations with partners. When specificity of output to a particular buyer (processor, retailer) is 
high (technology, quality, time of delivery, site-specificity) then delivery contracts with the 
respective partner are employed to tailor or protect transactions. Here division of labor and 
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specialization in vertical chain is governed by a private order rather than classical market 
competition. Intra-firm processing and retailing is also practiced by some farms. That further 
extends farm boundaries through internal organization and specialization of interdependent 
activities. Larger operational size and frequency of transacting provide an economic 
opportunity for internal exploration of interdependent assets (farming-processing-retailing). 
Vertical integration helps protect dependent investments and payoffs from marketing of 
processed products - getting full profit, brand name trade, lessened market dependency (easy 
storage, transportation).  
 
VII. Governing and specialization of production cooperatives 
 
Cooperatives are the biggest farms in terms of land and labor management (Table 2). 
Coops concentrate a major part of cereals, oil and forage crops, orchards and vineyards, and 
they are a key service providers for their members and rural population.  
The cooperative was the single most effective form of organization in the absence of 
settled rights for main agrarian resources and/or inherited high interdependence of available 
assets (restituted farmland, acquired individual shares in the actives of old cooperatives, 
narrow specialization of labor) (Bachev, 2006: 141). Moreover, most cooperatives developed 
along with small-scale and subsistent farming. Namely, ‘not-for-profit’ character and strong 
membership (rather than market) orientation attracted many households. As for production, 
the coop was perceived as effective (cheap, stable) form of supplying highly specific to 
individual farm inputs and services (feed for animals; mechanization; storage, processing, and 
marketing of output) as well as food for households. The cooperative, rather than other formal 
collective (e.g. firm) forms, has been mostly preferred. Coops were initiated by older 
generation entrepreneurs and tradition has played a role. Besides, this mode allows 
individuals an easy (low cost) entrance and exit keeping control over a major resource (land) 
and permitting a democratic participation in and supervision over management. In addition, 
cooperative form provides some important tax advantages (exemption from sale transactions 
with members, and received rent in kind) and possibilities for organizing transactions that are 
not legitimate for other modes (e.g. credit supply, marketing, and lobbying nation-wide).  
Larger operational size gives cooperatives a great opportunity for efficient use of labor 
(teamwork, division and specialization of work), farmland (cultivation in big consolidated 
plots, effective crop rotation), and material assets (exploration of economy of scale/scope of 
large machinery). In addition, they have a superior potential to minimize market uncertainty 
(‘risk pooling’, advertisement, storing, integration into processing and marketing), and 
organize critical transactions (access to credit; negotiating positions in input supply and 
marketing; facilitate land consolidation through lease-in and lease-out deals; technological 
innovations), and invest in intangible capital (reputation, labels, brand names).  
Cooperative activities are not difficult to manage since internal (members) demand for 
output and services is known and ‘marketing’ secured. In addition, coops concentrate on few 
highly standardized (mass) products with stable market and profitability. All these assists 
financing: advance funding of activities commissioned by members is commonly practiced, 
while production of universal commodities is easily financed by public programs or 
commercial credit. Furthermore, coops offer low-cost long-term leasing of land. That is often 
coupled with simultaneous lease-out deals as a specific mode for cashing coops output or 
facilitating relations between landowners and private farms. The integral organization of 
critical ‘services’ and inputs supply is broadly practiced. Output-based payment of labor is 
common, which restricts opportunism and minimizes internal transaction costs. Besides, 
cooperatives provide employment for members who otherwise would have no other job 
opportunities - housewives, pre- and/or retired persons. They are preferred employers since 
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they offer higher job security, social payments, paid holidays etc. Marketing risk is governed 
by effective delivery contracts or integrated into own processing. In a situation of ‘missing 
markets’ in rural areas, the cooperative mode is also the single form for organizing important 
activities such as bakeries, wholesale, retail trade etc. Given considerable transacting benefits, 
most coop members accept lower than market returns on their resources - lower wages, 
inferior or no rent for land and dividends for shares.  
There have been some adjustments in size of coops, memberships, and production 
structure. Number of them have moved toward corporate (‘new generation’) type of 
governance, applying profit-making goals, closed-membership policies and joint-ventures 
with other organizations. At the same time, cooperatives show certain disadvantages as form 
for farm organization. Large coalition makes individual and collective control over 
management very difficult (costly) providing possibilities for mismanagement (on-the-job 
consumption, unprofitable members’ deals). Besides, there are differences in investment 
preferences of the diverse members (old-younger; working-non-working; large-small 
shareholders) due to the non-tradable character of cooperative shares (‘horizon problem’). 
Given the fact that most members are old in age, small shareholders, and non-permanent 
employees, the incentives for long-term investment in cooperatives have been very low. 
Finally, many coops fall short adapting to diversified (service) needs of members and 
exploring potential of inter-cooperative modes. Accordingly, cooperatives’ long-term 
efficiency diminishes considerably in relation to market, contract and partnership modes, and 
almost forty percent of coops have gone bankrupt or ceased to exist in last five years. 
 
VIII. Governing and specialization of unregistered farms 
 
Majority of commercial farms are ‘unregistered farms’8 which are mainly in labor-
intensive productions (vegetables, tobacco, vineyards, berries, melons, flowers, mushrooms, 
medicinal and aromatic crops, livestock, sericulture, bee kipping) and natural meadows. 
Those are predominately individual or family holdings, and farm size is exclusively 
determined by available household resources – farmland, labor, finance. Internal governing 
costs are insignificant since transactions are between family members (common goals, high 
confidence, and no cheating behavior dominates) or not existing at all (one-person farm). 
Small collective organization is also practiced for some production activities which allows a 
partial exploration of economies of scale or make a part-time farming practically possible. 
The former mode is cost-effective since transactions are not complicated and easily 
controlled. Group members are usually close friends, neighbors, or relatives, and mutual trust 
and self-restriction of opportunism govern relations.  
Commercial farmers have strong incentives to adapt to market demand and increase 
productivity (intensifying work, investing in human and material assets) since they own the 
whole residuals (income). Extension of farm size through outside supply of labor or services 
is restricted since directing, monitoring, and disputing costs are extremely high in labor-
demanding and spatially dispersed productions. External financing of farming via debt, equity 
sell, or preferential public programs have been out of reach because of the high costs for 
preparing project proposals; meeting formal paperwork, ownership, coo-financing etc. 
requirements; and ‘arranging’ funding. Thus possibility for effective farm enlargement and 
growth in productivity through intra-farm division and specialization of labor, mechanization, 
application of chemicals, innovation has been limited by the small internal investment 
                                                 
8 In Bulgaria there is not a formal requirement to register a farm. Official statistics report as ‘Physical 
Persons’ unregistered farms meeting certain criteria (minimum size of farmland, number of animals 
etc.). 
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capacity (savings, profit). In general, primitive technologies and poor environmental and 
animal welfare standards prevail (Bachev, 2006: 143). As much as forty percent of surveyed 
farms report not using essential services at all. Low cost, outside land supply (leasing) is 
practiced by commercial farms to explore economies of scale on existing assets. Outside 
supply of indispensable inputs and services (seeds, chemicals, veterinary) is not connected 
with significant costs since they have occasional and standardized character (low specificity, 
many suppliers). In contrast, highly-specific feed supplies for animals and mechanization 
services are effectively secured through joint ownership modes such as cooperative and group 
farming.  
Own farm enterprise has been secure mode for providing (full or part-time) employment 
for family members. Family organization is also an effective form for intergeneration transfer 
of farm-specific intangible assets (know-how, reputation). However, small-scale commercial 
farms have little ability to meet institutional and market restrictions, and bear the risk, and 
protect against natural and market hazards. A great number of them face great transacting 
difficulties in marketing of their output. Most often they are not preferable partners for big 
buyers because of small volume and less-standardized character of output, and impossibility 
(unaffordable costs) to verify quality of products through laboratory tests, certificates etc. On 
the other hand, official wholesale markets have been inaccessible for these farms for the 
reason of great distance; high fees; and requirements for volume, special preparation, 
certification. Besides, farms frequently experience no accomplishment of contract obligations 
(none or delayed payment), huge market price fluctuation, monopoly situation, missing 
markets etc. In order to protect transacting and avoid unwanted exchanges primitive forms for 
risk minimization is commonly used such as investment in more universal but less productive 
(profitable) assets, diversification of production, informal cash and carry deals, direct retail 
marketing etc.  
With exception of tobacco producers, the development of effective collective 
organization for risk sharing, price negotiation, marketing, and/or lobbying for public support, 
have been difficult. That has been because of the high transacting costs (‘free riding’ 
problem), diversified interests of individual farmers (old-young farmers; larger or smaller-size 
farms; specialized-diversified operators etc.), and low reputation and inefficiency of new 
emerging farmers associations. Majority of small commercial farms are vulnerable and have 
poor mechanisms to protect from outside institutional, market, and natural disturbances. Most 
of them have little ability to face severe market competition, and meet fast evolving 
institutional (e.g. EU) restrictions, and bear the risk, and safeguard against natural and market 
hazard (buy insurance, diversify, or cooperate). All these bring about to a significant income 
variation for individual farms, sectors, regions, and different years. What is more, farms in 
entire sub-sectors (like dairy) have been unable to adapt to new market and institutional order 
associated with EU integration. Consequently, there has been a constant process of transfer of 
land management toward bigger farms, restriction/ceasing of commercial activities, and 
decreasing the number of small farms. 
Last but not least important, unlike other forms of organization the life cycle of one-
person (family) farm is greatly determined by the age of the entrepreneur. Besides, incentives 
for a long-term investment in specialized assets for increasing sustainability are low for older 
farmers since there is no secondary market for farm-specific assets (investments in human 
capital, good reputation, know-how, organizational modernization). Therefore, a good number 
of small commercial farms operate at low sustainable level given the fact that most of the 
farm managers and labor are old in age.  
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IX. Conclusions 
 
Post-communist transformation of Bulgarian agriculture let us determine factors, modes, 
and extend of farming specialization and governance in a fast changing institutional and 
market environment. We have demonstrated that particular type and pace of institutional 
modernization and market adjustment are responsible for evolution of new and specific (quite 
different from other European countries) forms for farming organization and specialization. 
Bulgarian model is characterized with a huge subsistence and part-time farming, production 
cooperation at a great scale, enormous concentration of resources in few business enterprises, 
widespread use of vertically integrated modes, domination of informal modes and personal 
relations, numerous missing markets and failures, backward technological ‘development’, 
significant government failures.  
The high efficiency and sustainability of all these structures could be only explained by 
the specific institutional restrictions and comparative transaction costs and benefits of 
individual modes. The later eventually determines the kind and extend of agricultural 
specialization within the farm (internal mode) and across markets (between farms). In one 
case, it leads to a great restriction of the farm size and specialization far below the 
technologically optimal level (subsistence, part-time and small-scale farming). In other 
instances, the same factors are responsible for enormous integration of activities and 
extension of farms boundaries beyond the technological determinants.  
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